JEL classification

Journal of Economic Literature Classification (10696) C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods (1374) C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory (176) C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory (36)
Number of items at this level: 36.
A
  • Holman, Nancy, Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M. (2015). No escape? The coordination problem in heritage preservation. Environment and Planning A, 47(1), 172 - 187. https://doi.org/10.1068/a130229p
    • B
  • Baccara, Mariagiovanna, Collard-Wexler, Allan, Felli, Leonardo, Yariv, Leeat (2014). Child adoption matching: preferences for gender and race. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 6(3), 133-158. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.6.3.133
  • Barthel, Fabian, Neumayer, Eric (2012). Competing for scarce foreign capital: spatial dependence in the diffusion of double taxation treaties. International Studies Quarterly, 56(4), 645-660. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00757.x
  • Binmore, Ken G, Shaked, Avner, Sutton, John (1985). Testing non-cooperative bargaining theory: a preliminary study. American Economic Review, 75(5), 1178-1180.
  • Binmore, Ken G, Shaked, Avner, Sutton, John (1988). A further test of non-cooperative bargaining theory: reply. American Economic Review, 78(4), 837-839.
  • Binmore, Ken G, Shaked, Avner, Sutton, John (1989). An outside option experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(4), 753-770. https://doi.org/10.2307/2937866
  • Bozbay, Irem, Dietrich, Franz, Peters, Hans (2011). Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Games and Economic Behavior, 74(1), 407-417. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.007
  • Felli, Leonardo, Baccara, Mariagiovanna, Collard-Wexler, Allan, Yariv, Leeat (2010). Child adoption matching: preferences for gender and race. (NBER working paper series 16444). National Bureau of Economic Research.
  • Sandmann, Christopher, Bonneton, Nicolas (2025). Existence of a non-stationary equilibrium in search-and-matching models: tu and ntu. Theoretical Economics, 20(4), 1411 - 1460. https://doi.org/10.3982/te5723 picture_as_pdf
    • C
  • Carozzi, Felipe, Cipullo, Davide, Repetto, Luca (2022). Political fragmentation and government stability: evidence from local governments in Spain. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 14(2), 23 - 50. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200128 picture_as_pdf
  • Cuñat, Vicente (1999). Determinantes del plazo de endeudamiento de las empresas españolas. Investigaciones Económicas, 23(3), 351-392.
  • Koutroumpis, Pantelis, Cave, Martin (2018). Auction design and auction outcomes. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 53(3), 275-297. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-018-9358-x
    • D
  • Diaz-Moreno, Carlos, Galdon-Sanchez, Jose E. (2000). Collective bargaining under complete information. (TE 401). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Diskin, Abraham, Felsenthal, Dan S. (2007). Individual rationality and bargaining. Public Choice, 133(1-2), 25-29. https://doi.org/10.1007/s1112700792127
  • Doval, Laura, Szentes, Balázs (2025). On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets. Games and Economic Behavior, 150, 106 - 130. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.019
    • E
  • Eeckhout, Jan, Kircher, Philipp (2011). Identifying sorting: in theory. Review of Economic Studies, 78(3), 872-906. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdq034
  • Eeckhout, Jan, Kircher, Philipp (2010). Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(4), 1354-1385. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.005
  • Elliott, Matt, Nava, Francesco (2019). Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core. Theoretical Economics, 14(1), 211-251. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2416
    • F
  • Felli, Leonardo, Harris, Christopher (2006). Firm-specific training. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Felli, Leonardo, Roberts, Kevin (2001). Does competition solve the hold-up problem? Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Felli, Leonardo, Roberts, Kevin W. S. (2002). Does competition solve the hold-up problem? Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Foerster, Hanno, Obermeier, Tim, Schulz, Bastian (2024). Job displacement, remarriage and marital sorting. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP2045). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance. picture_as_pdf
    • G
  • Galasso, Alberto (2007). Broad cross-license agreements and persuasive patent litigation: theory and evidence from the semiconductor industry. (EI 45). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Galenianos, Manolis, Kircher, Philipp (2009). Directed search with multiple job applications. Journal of Economic Theory, 144(2), 445-471. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.007
    • H
  • Hortala-Vallve, Rafael (2011). Generous legislators?: a description of vote trading agreements. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 6(2), 179-196. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00010034
    • L
  • de Meza, David, Lockwood, Ben (1998). The property-rights theory of the firm with endogenous timing of asset purchase. (TE 364). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
    • N
  • Nax, Heinrich H. (2015). Equity dynamics in bargaining without information exchange. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 25(5), 1011-1026. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-015-0405-9
  • Nax, Heinrich H., Pradelski, Bary S. R. (2015). Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games. International Journal of Game Theory, 44(4), 903-932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0459-1
  • Ngai, L. Rachel, Tenreyro, Silvana (2014). Hot and cold seasons in the housing market. American Economic Review, 104(12), 3991-4026. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.3991
    • P
  • Peski, Marcin, Szentes, Balázs (2013). Spontaneous discrimination. American Economic Review, 103(6), 2412-2436. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.6.2412
  • Petropoulou, Dimitra (2008). Competing for contacts: network competition, trade intermediation and fragmented duopoly. (CEPDP 854). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Petropoulou, Dimitra (2008). Information costs, networks and intermediation in international trade. (CEPDP 848). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Prat, Andrea, Rustichini, A. (1998). Sequential common agency. Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University.
    • R
  • de Almeida Vilares, Hugo, Reis, Hugo (2022). Who's got the power? Wage determination and its resilience in the Great Recession. (CEP Discussion Papers 1885). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance. picture_as_pdf
    • S
  • Spinnewijn, Johannes, Spinnewyn, Frans (2015). Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems. Review of Economic Design, 19(2), 91-116. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0168-7
    • T
  • Testa, Cecilia (2003). Government corruption and legislative procedures: is one chamber better than two? (DEDPS 41). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.