JEL classification

Journal of Economic Literature Classification (10696) C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods (1374) C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory (176) C72 - Noncooperative Games (60)
Number of items at this level: 60.
Accounting
  • Frantz, Pascal, Instefjord, Norvald, Walker, Martin (2007). Executive compensation contracts: a model of disclosure choice. Social Science Research Network. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.986729
    • Centre for Economic Performance
  • Caselli, Francesco, Coleman, Wilbur John (2013). On the theory of ethnic conflict. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(S1), 161-192. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01103.x
  • Ornelas, Emanuel, Turner, John L. (2007). Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control. Games and Economic Behavior, 60(1), 187-199. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.004
    • Centre for Macroeconomics
  • Barrdear, John (2014). Peering into the mist: social learning over an opaque observation network. (CFM discussion paper series CFM-DP2014-9). Centre For Macroeconomics.
    • Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences (CPNSS)
  • Nax, Heinrich H., Rigos, Alexandros (2015). Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas. Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich.
    • Economics
  • Bergemann, Dirk, Pesendorfer, Martin (2007). Information structures in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1), 580-609. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001
  • Bergemann, Dirk, Pesendorfer, Martin (2001). Information structures in optimal auctions. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Binmore, Ken G, Shaked, Avner, Sutton, John (1985). Testing non-cooperative bargaining theory: a preliminary study. American Economic Review, 75(5), 1178-1180.
  • Binmore, Ken G, Shaked, Avner, Sutton, John (1988). A further test of non-cooperative bargaining theory: reply. American Economic Review, 78(4), 837-839.
  • Cartwright, Edward J., Mirza, Zarak (2021). Charitable giving when donors are constrained to give a minimum amount. Oxford Economic Papers, 73(1), 295 - 316. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpz063
  • Caselli, Francesco, Coleman, Wilbur John (2013). On the theory of ethnic conflict. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(S1), 161-192. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01103.x
  • Chassang, Sylvain, Padró i Miquel, Gerard (2008). Conflict and deterrence under strategic risk. (NBER working papers 13964). NBER.
  • Eliaz, Kfir, Spiegler, Ran, Thysen, Heidi C. (2021). Strategic interpretations. Journal of Economic Theory, 192, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105192 picture_as_pdf
  • Eyster, Erik (2007). Party platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies. Theoretical Economics, 2, 41-70.
  • Hajivassiliou, Vassilis (2019). Switching regressions with imperfect regime classification information: theory and applications. (STICERD Econometrics Papers 610). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines. picture_as_pdf
  • Kirchsteiger, Georg, Prat, Andrea (2001). Inefficient equilibria in lobbying. Journal of Public Economics, 82(3), 349-375. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00134-1
  • Nava, Francesco, Piccione, Michele (2014). Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring. Theoretical Economics, 9(1), 279-312. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1200
  • Otsu, Taisuke, Pesendorfer, Martin, Takahashi, Yuya (2013). Testing for equilibrium multiplicity in dynamic Markov games. (Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 423). picture_as_pdf
  • Otsu, Taisuke, Pesendorfer, Martin, Takahashi, Yuya (2016). Pooling data across markets in dynamic Markov games. Quantitative Economics, 7(2), 523 - 559. https://doi.org/10.3982/QE612
  • Prat, Andrea, Rustichini, A. (1998). Sequential common agency. Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University.
  • Weizsacker, Georg (2008). Do we follow others when we should? A simple test of rational expectations. ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, University College London.
  • İriş, D., Lee, J., Tavoni, A. (2019). Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game. Environmental and Resource Economics, 74(3), 1331 - 1353. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-019-00371-6 picture_as_pdf
    • Finance
  • Dasgupta, Amil, Steiner, Jakub, Stewart, Colin (2012). Dynamic coordination with individual learning. Games and Economic Behavior, 74(1), 83-101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.005
    • Financial Markets Group
  • Carletti, Elena (2001). The structure of bank relationships, endogenous monitoring and loan rates. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 388). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Dasgupta, Amil, Steiner, Jakub, Stewart, Colin (2007). Efficient dynamic coordination with individual learning. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 600). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Heinemann, Frank, Nagel, Rosemarie, Ockenfels, Peter (2002). Speculative attacks and financial architecture: experimental analysis of coordination games with public and private information. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 416). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
    • Geography and Environment
  • Engel, Stefanie, López, Ramón, Palmer, Charles (2006). Community-industry contracting over natural resource use in a context of weak property rights: the case of Indonesia. Environmental and Resource Economics, 33(1), 73-93. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-005-1706-5
  • Kim, Hyoyoung, Iris, Doruk, Lee, Jinkwon, Tavoni, Alessandro (2025). Representation, peer pressure and punishment in a public goods game. Environmental and Resource Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-025-00970-6
  • İriş, D., Lee, J., Tavoni, A. (2019). Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game. Environmental and Resource Economics, 74(3), 1331 - 1353. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-019-00371-6 picture_as_pdf
    • Government
  • Hortala-Vallve, Rafael (2011). Generous legislators?: a description of vote trading agreements. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 6(2), 179-196. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00010034
  • Hortala-Vallve, Rafael (2012). Qualitative voting. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 24(4), 526-554. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629811432658
  • Hortala-Vallve, Rafael (2006). Qualitative voting. (Economics Series Working Papers 320). Department of Economics, University of Oxford.
  • Hortala-Vallve, Rafael, Llorente-Saguer, Aniol (2010). Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum Colonel Blotto games. London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Hortala-Vallve, Rafael, Llorente-Saguer, Aniol (2012). Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games. International Journal of Game Theory, 41(2), 331-343. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0288-4
    • Grantham Research Institute
  • Isaksen, Elisabeth Thuestad, Brekke, Kjell Arne, Richter, Andries (2019). Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 95, 45-56. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.11.005 picture_as_pdf
  • Tavoni, Alessandro (2009-01-23 - 2009-01-24) Incorporating fairness motives and quantal response equilibrium concepts: an application to 2x2 games [Other]. 14th Coalition Theory Network workshop, Maastricht, Netherlands, NLD.
  • Tavoni, Alessandro (2008-07-06 - 2008-07-12) The role of fairness motives and spatial considerations in explaining departures from Nash equilibrium: stationary and evolutionary lessons from 2x2 games [Paper]. EAERE-FEEM-VIU European Summer School "Space in unified models of economy and ecology", Venice, Italy, ITA.
  • İriş, D., Lee, J., Tavoni, A. (2019). Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game. Environmental and Resource Economics, 74(3), 1331 - 1353. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-019-00371-6 picture_as_pdf
    • LSE
  • Naroditskiy, Victor, Steinberg, Richard (2015). Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution. Games and Economic Behavior, 93, 24-41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.010
  • Portugal, Adriana Cuoco, Bugarin, Maurício (2007). Electoral campaign financing: the role of public contributions and party ideology. Economía, 8(1), 143 - 171. https://doi.org/10.1353/eco.2008.0008 picture_as_pdf
    • LSE Health
  • Alpern, Steven, Morton, Alec, Papadaki, Katerina (2011). Patrolling games. Operations Research, 59(5), 1246-1257. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1110.0983
    • Management
  • Alonso, Ricardo, Rantakari, Heikki (2014). The art of brevity. (USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series). University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business.
  • Alonso, Ricardo, Rantakari, Heikki (2022). The art of brevity. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 195, 257 - 271. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2022.01.014 picture_as_pdf
  • Alpern, Steven, Morton, Alec, Papadaki, Katerina (2011). Patrolling games. Operations Research, 59(5), 1246-1257. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1110.0983
  • Li, Ming, Madarász, Kristóf (2008). When mandatory disclosure hurts: expert advice and conflicting interests. Journal of Economic Theory, 139(1), 47-74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.009
    • Mathematics
  • Alpern, Steve, Gal, Shmuel, Solan, Eilon (2010). A sequential selection game with vetoes. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.05.006
  • Alpern, Steven, Morton, Alec, Papadaki, Katerina (2011). Patrolling games. Operations Research, 59(5), 1246-1257. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1110.0983
  • Budish, Eric, Lewis-Pye, Andrew, Roughgarden, Tim (2024). The economic limits of permissionless consensus. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 704 - 731. https://doi.org/10.1145/3670865.3673548 picture_as_pdf
  • Cole, Richard, Correa, Jose, Gkatzelis, Vasillis, Mirrokni, Vahab, Olver, Neil (2011-06-06 - 2011-06-08) Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games [Paper]. 43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, San Jose, California, San Jose, United States, USA.
  • Cole, Richard, Correa, Jose, Gkatzelis, Vasillis, Mirrokni, Vahab, Olver, Neil (2015). Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games. Games and Economic Behavior, 92, 306 - 326. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.011 picture_as_pdf
  • Gossner, Olivier (2010). Ability and knowledge. Games and Economic Behavior, 69(1), 95-106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.011
  • Gossner, Olivier, Hörner, Johannes (2010). When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? Journal of Economic Theory, 145(1), 63-84. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.002
  • Peretz, Ron (2012). The strategic value of recall. Games and Economic Behavior, 74(1), 332-351. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.013
  • Peretz, Ron, Bavly, Gilad (2014). How to gamble against all odds. Games and Economic Behavior,
  • von Stengel, Bernhard (2003). Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games. (CDAM research report series LSE-CDAM-2003-13). Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • von Stengel, Bernhard, Zamir, Schmuel (2004). Leadership with commitment to mixed strategies. (CDAM research report series LSE-CDAM-2004-01). Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • von Stengel, Bernhard (2010). Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games. Games and Economic Behavior, 69(2), 512-516. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.012
  • von Stengel, Bernhard (2016). Recursive inspection games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 41(3), 935-952. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2015.0762
  • von Stengel, Bernhard, Zamir, Shmuel (2010). Leadership games with convex strategy sets. Games and Economic Behavior, 69(2), 446-457. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.008
    • Psychological and Behavioural Science
  • Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Chowdhury, Subhasish M., Espín, Antonio M., Nieboer, Jeroen (2023). Born this way? Prenatal exposure to testosterone may determine behavior in competition and conflict. Journal of Economic Psychology, 96, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2023.102623 picture_as_pdf
    • STICERD
  • Bergemann, Dirk, Pesendorfer, Martin (2007). Information structures in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1), 580-609. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001
  • Bergemann, Dirk, Pesendorfer, Martin (2001). Information structures in optimal auctions. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Binmore, Ken G, Shaked, Avner, Sutton, John (1985). Testing non-cooperative bargaining theory: a preliminary study. American Economic Review, 75(5), 1178-1180.
  • Binmore, Ken G, Shaked, Avner, Sutton, John (1988). A further test of non-cooperative bargaining theory: reply. American Economic Review, 78(4), 837-839.
  • Kirchsteiger, Georg, Prat, Andrea (2001). Inefficient equilibria in lobbying. Journal of Public Economics, 82(3), 349-375. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00134-1
  • Prat, Andrea, Rustichini, A. (1998). Sequential common agency. Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University.
  • Roberts, Kevin (1999). Dynamic voting in clubs. (TE 367). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Sanchez-Villalba, Miguel (2006). Anti-evasion auditing policy in the presence of common income shocks. (DARP 80). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
    • Social Policy
  • Andersson, Ola, Galizzi, Matteo M., Hoppe, Tim, Kranz, Sebastian, der Wiel, Karen van, Wengström, Erik (2010). Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games. Economics Letters, 108(1), 16-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011
    • Statistics
  • Anthropelos, Michail, Kardaras, Constantinos (2017). Equilibrium in risk-sharing games. Finance and Stochastics, 21(3), 815-865. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-017-0323-9
    • Systemic Risk Centre
  • Gong, Rui, Page, Frank, Wooders, Myrna (2015). Endogenous correlated network dynamics. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 39). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science.