LSE creators

Number of items: 28.
Economics
  • Ellis, Andrew, Piccione, Michele, Zhang, Shengxing (2022). Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs. Theoretical Economics, 17(1), 121 - 152. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4157 picture_as_pdf
  • Ellis, Andrew, Piccione, Michele (2017). Correlation misperception in choice. American Economic Review, 107(4), 1264-1292. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160093
  • Dekel, Eddie, Piccione, Michele (2014). The strategic dis/advantage of voting early. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(4), 162-179. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.4.162
  • Nava, Francesco, Piccione, Michele (2014). Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring. Theoretical Economics, 9(1), 279-312. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1200
  • Piccione, Michele, Spiegler, Ran (2014). Manipulating market sentiment. Economics Letters, 122(2), 370-373. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.021
  • Eyster, Erik, Piccione, Michele (2013). An approach to asset-pricing under incomplete and diverse perceptions. Econometrica, 81(4), 1483-1506. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10499
  • Nava, Francesco, Piccione, Michele (2012). Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring. London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Piccione, Michele, Spiegler, Ran (2012). Price competition under limited comparability. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1), 97-135. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr053
  • Piccione, Michele, Razin, Ronny (2009). Coalition formation under power relations. Theoretical Economics, 4(1), 1-15.
  • Piccione, Michele, Rubenstein, Ariel (2008). Luxury prices: an expository note. Japanese Economic Review, 59(1), 127-132. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00413.x
  • Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, Ariel (2007). Equilibrium in the jungle. The Economic Journal, 117(522), 883-896. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02072.x
  • Mariotti, Thomas, Meier, Martin, Piccione, Michele (2005). Hierarchies of beliefs for compact possibility models. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 41(3), 303-324. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.009
  • Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, Ariel (2004). The curse of wealth and power. Journal of Economic Theory, 117(1), 119-123. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.003
  • Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, Ariel (2003). Modeling the economic interaction of agents with diverse abilities to recognise equilibrium patterns. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(1), 212-223. https://doi.org/10.1162/154247603322256819
  • Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, Ariel (2002). Modelling the economic interaction of agents with diverse abilities to recognise equilibrium patterns. (Theoretical Economics; TE/2002/440 TE/02/440). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Piccione, Michele (2002). The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory, 102(1), 70-83. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2819
  • Hendricks, K, Piccione, Michele, Tan, G (1999). Equilibria in networks. Econometrica, 67(6), 1407-1434. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00085
    • LSE
  • Dekel, E, Piccione, Michele (2000). Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections. Journal of Political Economy, 108(1), 34-55.
  • Binmore, K, Piccione, Michele, Samuelson, L (1998). Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games. Journal of Economic Theory, 80(2), 257-291.
  • Hendricks, K, Piccione, Michele, Tan, G (1997). Entry and exit in hub-spoke networks. RAND Journal of Economics, 28(2), 291-303.
  • Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, A (1997). On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall. Games and Economic Behavior, 20(1), 3-24.
  • Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, A (1997). The absent-minded driver''s paradox : synthesis and responses. Games and Economic Behavior, 20(1), 121-130.
  • Piccione, Michele, Tan, G (1996). Cost-reducing investment, optimal procurement and implementation by auctions. International Economic Review, 37(3), 663-686.
  • Piccione, Michele, Tan, G (1996). A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 70(2), 501-515.
  • Hendricks, K, Piccione, Michele, Tan, G (1995). The economics of hubs : the case of monopoly. Review of Economic Studies, 62(1)(210), 83-100.
  • Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, A (1993). Finite automata play a repeated extensive game. Journal of Economic Theory, 61(1), p. 160.
  • Piccione, Michele (1992). Finite automata equilibria with discounting. Journal of Economic Theory, 56(1), p. 180.
    • STICERD
  • Piccione, Michele, Spiegler, Ran (2014). Manipulating market sentiment. Economics Letters, 122(2), 370-373. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.021
  • Nava, Francesco, Piccione, Michele (2011). Efficiency in repeated two-action games with local monitoring. (Theoretical Economics TE/2012/560). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Piccione, Michele, Razin, Ronny (2009). Coalition formation under power relations. Theoretical Economics, 4(1), 1-15.
  • Piccione, Michele, Rubenstein, Ariel (2008). Luxury prices: an expository note. Japanese Economic Review, 59(1), 127-132. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00413.x
  • Mariotti, Thomas, Meier, Martin, Piccione, Michele (2005). Hierarchies of beliefs for compact possibility models. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 41(3), 303-324. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.009
  • Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, Ariel (2003). Modeling the economic interaction of agents with diverse abilities to recognise equilibrium patterns. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(1), 212-223. https://doi.org/10.1162/154247603322256819
  • Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, Ariel (2002). Modelling the economic interaction of agents with diverse abilities to recognise equilibrium patterns. (Theoretical Economics; TE/2002/440 TE/02/440). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Piccione, Michele (2002). The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory, 102(1), 70-83. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2819